All our statements about the physical world are expressed in terms of everyday notions and thus in terms of classical physics. This necessity is behind each of our attempt to extract meaning out of empirical data and to communicate this knowledge to others. As such, it must apply also to the account of measurement arrangements and to the outcome in quantum experiments. On the other hand, however, if quantum mechanics is universally valid it should be possible to give a purely quantum mechanical description of objects of increasingly large sizes, eventually of the measurement devices themselves. It is suggested to resolve this dilemma by using the method of von Weizsäcker's circular and consistent movement in a reconstruction (Kreisgang) in which it is legitimate to recover the elements with which one started the reconstruction. The parameters entering the complex amplitudes of a quantum state have an operational meaning as parameters that specify the configuration of macroscopic instruments by which the state is prepared and measured. This classical aspect in each quantum description is at the "beginning" of the Kreisgang. The Kreisgang is "closed" by showing that under the every-day conditions of coarse-grained measurements a description of macroscopic instruments emerges in terminology of classical physics and the three-dimensional ordinary space from within quantum theory.
All our statements about the physical world are statements about the classical measurement apparatus and its classical features. It does not make any sense to speak about characteristics of the quantum system in itself without explicitly specifying the measuring apparatus. Bohr put much emphasize in his writings on the fact that the conditions under which an observer can acquire objective knowledge and communicate it with others requires a classical description of the measuring apparatus, even then when the phenomena under investigation are very distinct from those of the classical world view. For example, in a paper [1] of 1949, Bohr stressed that "However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is simply that by the word 'experiment' we refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and the result of observation must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology of classical physics." In similar vein, when discussing the Copenhagen view, Grunbaum [2] introduces the ontology of macrophysicalism according to which "the existences of the physical world are the macro-object and events of classical physics. Micro-objects do not exit as such at all but can be introduced into physical theory as a kind of computational or linguistic link between specifiable experimental arrangements and their observable consequences. Accordingly, to speak of electrons, for example, as 'interacting' with measuring devices has, existentially, only a Pickwickian meaning. For only the registrational processes and components of the classical-describable total experimental arrangements are existents."
The decisive role played by the classical measurement apparatus in the epistemological framework of quantum physics was often not accepted or even misunderstood by many scholars. This circumstance was, for example, recently emphasized by Osnaghi, Freitas and Freire [3] , who write: "Bohr's functional distinction between object-system and measuring instrument was replaced by the crude physical assumption that macroscopic systems behave classically, which would introduce an artificial split of the physical world into a quantum microcosms and a classical macrocosms." The main misunderstanding surrounding the alleged dichotomy in the Copenhagen view comes from the assertion that a measurement device itself is built up of microscopic systems, such as atoms or protons and electrons, for which the appropriateness of the quantum mechanical description seems to be indisputable. In further elaboration of this view, the measurement procedure is considered to be a particular kind of physical interaction occurring between system (I) and measurement apparatus (II) for which it is possible to set up the quantum state for the apparatus, the Hamiltonian for the interaction between the system and apparatus, and the Schrödinger evolution. However, from the Copenhagen viewpoint, the quantum state acquires a physical meaning only when it has been related to the well-specified measurement procedure through which the observables are defined. While there is nothing in the theory that would prohibit to reach the necessary experimental precision to allow a meaningful state assignment to objects of increasingly large sizes -eventually as large as our measurement devices -it is indispensable to use classical concepts for describing the experimental context in which these objects are observed. By appealing to the logical necessity of making a sharp distinction between object and the measurement apparatus, the device II can only be considered as a part of the composite system I+II which is to be described by the Schrödinger evolution, if it loses its previous status of "measurement apparatus". In order to speak about a quantum state of the composite system I+II, it would actually be necessary to perform a measurement with another apparatus III by which the conditions leading to the appearance of quantum features of I+II can be established, in the same way as a meaningful assignment of a quantum state to I was acquired through the measurement procedure defined by apparatus II.
To illustrate the preceding argument take, for example, a spin-1/2 system in the state |z+ . What we mean with this syntax or symbol, is that the probability to find the outcome "spin up" when the Stern-Gerlach magnet is oriented along an angle θ with respect to the +z-direction is p = cos 2 (θ/2). We see that we never speak about the quantum state per se, but always refer to some well-defined configuration of macroscopic instruments in the ordinary three-dimensional space by which the conditions defining the probability for an outcome are established. When considering macroscopic measurement devices -which in order to fulfill their function necessarily need to consist of a large number of elementary constituents -it may seem natural to assume that a description of each of its individual constituents and thus of the entire device can be given purely in quantum mechanical terms. The main difficulty of such a total reduction of the description of the measurement apparatus to the quantum description of its elementary constituents lies in the obvious fact that quantum states of these constituents can acquire a meaning only in a classically describable experimental context, thus making the whole argument indefinite in its hierarchical structure. Criticizing such attempts Rosenfeld [4] notes that: "... no formalization can be complete, but must leave undefined some 'primitive' concepts and take for granted without further analysis certain relations between these concepts, which are adopted as 'axioms': the concrete meaning of these primitive concepts and axioms can only be conveyed in a 'metalanguage' foreign to the formalism of the theory." In a similar fashion Peres [5] writes: "Even if quantum theory is universal, it is not closed. A distinction must be made between endophysical systems -those which are described by the theory -and exophysical ones, which lie outside the domain of the theory (for example, the telescopes and photographic plates used by astronomers for verifying the laws of celestial mechanics). While quantum theory can in principle describe anything, a quantum description cannot include everything. In every physical situation something must remain unanalyzed."
Though the measurement procedure is not entirely analyzable by means of quantum mechanical laws, it must be possible, for the reasons of consistency, to arrive at an explanation of objective properties of macroscopic objects as large as apparatuses from within quantum theory. In a joint work with Johannes Kofler, I have recently proposed one such approach [6] . While it is not at variance with decoherence [7] , it differs from it conceptually. It focuses on the limits of observability of quantum effects of macroscopic objects, i.e., on the required precision of our measurement apparatuses such that quantum phenomena can still be observed. We have considered spin systems and demonstrated that under the restriction of coarse-grained measurements and the limit of large spins not only macroscopic realism but even the classical Newtonian laws emerge out of the Schrödinger equation and the projection postulate. Classical deterministic laws are therefore an effective and convenient illusion insomuch one's observations are of sufficient inaccuracy [8] .
When trying to relate quantum and classical aspects of physical description in a hierarchical order, we run into the problem of infinite regress: On one hand, quantum states require classical instruments to be defined, on the other hand, the instruments themselves are supposed to be a subject of a quantum-mechanical description. Von Weiszäcker considered a complete and hierarchical description of nature to be unattainable. Instead he proposed Kreisgang as a methodological idea of a circular, but consistent, movement in reconstructing science without a need to introduce hierarchial relation between its basic elements [9] . He writes [9] : "Der Anspruch, damit eine volle Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit zu geben, dürfte uneinlösbar sein; legitim ist der Anspruch, eine in der gebenen Näherung [...] konsistente Beschreibung zu geben." It is important to realize that Kreisgang is not a circulus vitiosus of some required deductive "proof", rather it is a consistency argument in which it is legitime and even necessary to recover the elements of logic with which one started the reconstruction.
When trying to identify which aspects of the classical description should be employed at the "beginning" and recovered at the "end" of the Kreisgang in the reconstruction of quantum theory, it is instructive to analyze Bohr's writing [10] from 1958: "In actual experimental arrangements, the fulfillment of such requirements [describing unambiguously the apparatus and results of measurement] is secured by the use, as measuring instruments, of rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to allow a completely classical account of their relative positions and velocities. In this connection, it is also essential to remember that all unambiguous information concerning atomic objects is derived from the permanent marks -such as a spot on a photographic plate, caused by the impact of an electron -left on the bodies which define the experimental conditions. Far from involving any special intricacy, the irreversible amplification effects on which the recording of the presence of atomic objects rests rather remind us of the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation. The description of atomic phenomena has in these respects a perfectly objective character, in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer and that therefore [...] no ambiguity is involved in the communication of information." As noted by Howard [11] , Bohr distinguishes here two classical aspects of measurement apparatus: (i) the occurrence of "irreversible amplification effects" such as a spot on a photographic plate, a "click" in a photo-detector or the pointer moving in a given position, and (ii) "the use, as measuring instruments, of rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to allow a completely classical account of their relative positions and velocities." Three comments are appropriate at this point. Firstly, as pointed out by Bächtold [12] , Bohr never argued that all measurement outcomes must allow a full classical explanation in which the outcomes are understood as revealing some properties of the world existing prior to and independent of measurements (i.e. in terms of what we today call hidden variables). On the contrary, he repeatedly stressed that in quantum mechanics it is impossible to describe the measurement outcomes by applying simultaneously mutually complementary notions. Secondly, the investigations in the foundations of quantum mechanics have shown that not the "size" or "mass" of an object is relevant for the transition to classicality [13] , [5, 6] , but rather the precision of our observations. Therefore, Bohr's arguments concerning the necessity of using, "as measuring instruments, rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to allow a completely classical account of their relative positions and velocities" is correct insofar as it is increasingly demanding to perform accurate measurements on such bodies. Thirdly, one should leave open the possibility that explicit examples of what we today perceive as "irreversible amplification effects" might tomorrow be manipulated in a quantum coherent and reversible way. Clearly, to make an experimental record confirming this coherence one would again need to have some "irreversible amplification effects". While, therefore, establishment of measurement documents is a necessary condition to extract meaning out of the documents whatsoever, the cut between the measurement apparatus and the object under observation can be shifted and is, perhaps, only conditional on the current status of technological development.
The purpose of this manuscript is to show -on the example of quantum theory of spin -that the classical aspects of observation can be employed in the reconstruction of quantum theory in a consistent way, thus fulfilling the condition for a Kreisgang. To this end, I propose the following consistency condition: If in a theory the "state" of a (directional) elementary system (spin) requires d real parameters to be specified completely, then macroscopic objects and instruments under the restriction of coarse-grained observations must allow for an "objective" description of both (a) the account of the experimental arrangement and (b) the experimental outcome in a d + 1-dimensional (ordinary) space. This is for the simple reason that operationally real parameters specifying the state are the parameters determining the configuration of macroscopic instruments by which measurements on the state are performed. Note, however, that a priori, the consistency argument does not determine the dimension d. For complex quantum mechanics d = 2, for quaternionic quantum mechanics [14] 
It is legitimate to think that starting with the theory that differs from complex quantum theory and going into the limit of coarse-grained measurement one might arrive at the "classical physics" embedded in a space of dimensions different than the one of our everyday life. It should also be clarified that the "objective" description in the consistency condition given above is to be understood as a description that is communicable in an unambiguous manner, that is, independent of any observer, not as a description that allows explanation in terms of hidden variables.
I now show how the Kreisgang can be achieved in the reconstruction of (complex) quantum theory of spin. Consider a quantum-mechanical system of a large dimension with a set of 2 j + 1 distinguishable (orthogonal) states |▽ , |♠ , ..., |⋆ . The chosen notation should indicate that a priori no ordering of the states has been assumed. I suppose that the outcomes of everyday measurements are in principle directly observable with our sensory organs (e.g. with our eyes) such that the resolution of the measurements is not sharp, making it impossible to resolve individual states, but bunching together a number of outcomes into "slots". It is thus the context of a measurement where the notion of "neighboring" states emerges, by treating those states as close which correspond to outcomes that are observed close in real space. I therefore choose an arbitrary set of 2 j + 1 orthogonal states from the Hilbert space and impose on them an ordering: |▽ ≡ |m = − j , |♠ ≡ |m = − j + 1 , ..., |⋆ ≡ |m = j , which is to be understood as identifying them with the ordered outcomes in real space. The full justification of this procedure can only be achieved in the Kreisgang when showing the consistency of the choice of the state ordering.
Consider now a measurement of the eigenvalues m of the observable defined asĴ z = j m=− j m|m m| in units where = 1. At this stage of the argument one could think about this as purely mathematical definition of an observable, but bear in mind that, physically, it represents the z-component of the spin observable. I introduce the spin coherent states |Ω ≡ |ϑ, ϕ = m= j m=− j 2 j j+m 1/2 cos j+m (ϑ/2) sin j−m (ϑ/2)e imϕ |m , with polar ϑ and azimuthal angle ϕ, which are the eigenstates with maximal eigenvalue of a spin operatorĴ Ω pointing into the direction Ω ≡ (ϑ, ϕ):Ĵ Ω |Ω = j |Ω . It is known that any spin-j state can be written in the quasi-diagonal formρ = P(Ω) |Ω Ω| d 2 Ω with d 2 Ω the solid angle element and P(Ω) a normalized and not necessarily positive real function [15] .
As noted above, the resolution of our everyday measurements is not sharp, but bunches together ∆m outcomes of the spin z-componentĴ z into "slots"m. There are (2 j + 1)/∆m different slots. It was shown [6] that if the measurement coarseness is much larger than the intrinsic uncertainty of coherent states, i.e. ∆m ≫ √ j, then the probability for getting the particular slotm can be computed via integration of a positive probability distribution Q as given by
(1)
4π Ω|ρ|Ω is the well-known Q-function in quantum optics [16] and Ω m is the angular section of polar angular size ∆Θm ∼ ∆m ≫ 1/ √ j whose projection onto the z axis corresponds to the slotm. The quantum description of a spin in a general (mixed) state requires an order of j 2 real numbers to be specified. However, the effective description under coarsegrained measurements is always that of a convex mixture over classical spins embedded in the ordinary three-dimensional space (i.e. whose orientation requires two polar angles to be defined) independently of the spin size. In this way the Kreisgang is closed. We began with a description of a spin-1/2 quantum state in terms of two polar angles and we end with a description of large systems under coarse-grained measurements in terms of the two polar angles. This is not surprising if one accepts that parameters in the state |ψ ≡ cos(ϑ/2)e −iϕ/2 |z+ + sin(ϑ/2)e +iϕ/2 |z− of a spin-1/2 system have no other meaning than that of the angles along which the macroscopic Stern-Gerlach magnet needs to be oriented to observe the definite outcome "spin-up". We conclude that the account of the experimental arrangement is given in terms of the three-dimensional space (condition (a)).
Upon a coarse-grained measurement with outcomem, the stateρ is reduced toρ m and will change (this can be seen in the change of the P-function) ifρ contains coherence terms (i.e. non-diagonal elements) across the slots. Nonetheless, it can be shown [6] that the Q distribution before the measurement is the weighted mixture of the distributions Qm = 
This shows that a coarse-grained measurement can be understood classically as reducing the previous ignorance about predetermined properties of the spin system. For example, the Schrödinger-cat state |Ψ = (1/ √ 2)(| j+ + | j− ) will change into a classical mixtureρ mix = (1/2)(| j+ j + | + | j− j − |) under a (non-selective) coarse-grained measurement (e.g. ofĴ z ), but the two states will be perceived as the very same macroscopic state because the respective Q functions differ only in exponentially small (in j) amount. Therefore, the set of all coarse-grained measurements is non-invasive [17] on that part of state description that is relevant for predictions of the coarse-grained measurements, namely for the Q function.
For example, if we remove a single atom from a Stern-Gerlach magnet or flip the state of one of its spins, the quantum state of the entire magnet will change into an orthogonal one, but at the macroscopic level we perceive it as the very same SternGerlach magnet. This clearly shows that quantum and classical notions of distinguishability are different. The information represented by the Q-function can be read out repeatedly and independently by different observers, and it can be copied and communicated, without disturbing it. As such, it represents the "classical" part of the quantum description. The fact that the experimental outcome, as represented by a macroscopic property of measuring instrument, can directly be observed by means of the observer's sensory organs and will not change under this observation remaining accessible to other observers, enables inter-subjectivity, i.e. it enables the observers to agree on the meaning of the outcome. This explains why the experimental outcome can be given certain level of "objectivity" (condition (b)).
As stressed before, the fact that the measurement outcome is experienced as a stable [18] macroscopic property which can be repeatedly read out by independent observers, thus enquiring a level of "objectivity", does not imply that these macroscopic properties of the measurement apparatus can be understood as existing prior to and independent of the choice of the entire measurement context. For example, in the case of the measurements of different observables with two possible outcomes a 1 and a 2 , no dynamical equations of classical physics or even of any local realistic theory is able to determine into which of the two positions x 1 or x 2 the pointer of the apparatus will evolve from its initial position in all possible measurements, where x 1 is the position corresponding to outcome a 1 and x 2 is the position corresponding to a 2 . This is signified by the fact that two separated parties, performing only coarse-grained local measurements on the subsystems of an entangled quantum system can nonetheless violate Bell's inequality [19] , demonstrating the conflict with local realism. The important point here is that although for fixed measurement settings on the two sides of the Bell experiment, the results of local coarse-grained measurements can have a classical description in terms of the Q-functions, similarly as indicated by Eq. (1), i.e. can have a local hidden-variable model, the local changes of the settings in the two local laboratories cannot be explained by local transformation of the local variables in the hidden-variable model.
In conclusion, while it is unavoidable that certain aspects of classical description enter the reconstruction of quantum theory, this must be performed in a consistent manner -following the requirement of von Weizsäckers circular movement of knowledge known as Kreisgang. I began the Kreisgang with a quantum-mechanical description of an elementary (spin) system. The parameters entering the complex amplitudes of the quantum state operationally have the meaning of the parameters that specify the configuration of macroscopic instruments in the three-dimensional (ordinary) space (for example, the orientation of the Stern-Gerlach magnet). I closed the Kreisgang by showing that under every-day coarse-grained observations, one arrives at a description of macroscopic instruments in the terminology of classical physics and three-dimensional ordinary space from within the quantum description of its elementary quantum constituents.
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